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The concept of open book assessment is inherently controversial, not least because it 
contradicts a basic condition of examinations, one so basic to the event that we rarely question 
it: the single confrontation of examinee with exam question, the element of isolated and 
unaided struggle - Jacob wrestling with the mysterious Other.  Surely it is cheating to allow 
texts into an exam-hall?  What is the point of the exercise then?   
 
This question has been posed in the field of educational theory.  As the research there shows, 
assessment and learning have a complex and symbiotic relationship.  In one study, for 
instance, a medical faculty altered its assessment procedures in order to change the factual 
learning of students to clinical learning, with very positive results (Newble & Jaeger, 1983).  
In another, a change of assessment form from multiple-choice to essay then back again clearly 
demonstrated the effect that such a shift has upon student learning, turning superficial surface 
learning to deep learning and back to surface learning again (Thomas, 1986, quoted in 
Entwistle, 1992, p.39).  These and other studies prove that the effect assessment has upon 
student learning is crucial and that, more particularly, changing the form of assessment 
changes students’ learning patterns.   
 
As a result of this and much more research which we shall consider below, I would argue that 
the question as to the purpose of open book examination requires to be answered on three 
levels.  First of all, it involves scrutinising the learning objectives and teaching methods 
adopted in any particular course, and considering these together with matters such as course 
administration.  Second, and at a deeper level, open book assessment sometimes involves us 
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in reconsidering our models of the learning process; and our attitudes towards professional 
practice.  A third, perhaps most fundamental issue, is raised in programmes of study where 
there are assessment criteria stipulated by professional regulatory bodies.  In these 
circumstances the introduction of open book assessment opens up the whole relationship of 
theory to practice, in both educational and legal practice.  What effect do the educational 
theories of professional bodies have on assessment practices?  In this article I shall use the 
example of open book examinations as a type of 'critical incident' to help us analyse the 
complex relationship between theory and practice, and the implications of this relationship for 
effective legal education.1   
 
Open book exams: the literature 
The open book examination is of course not a new form of assessment.  In an illuminating 
article John Francis (1982) reviewed the literature dealing with its effectiveness.  He found 
that students' results were consistent over a wide spectrum of skills in different subject areas.  
Generally, he found that the advantages of open book regimes included the following points: 
• students relied less on rote learning 
• their anxiety about an examination was reduced 
• factual knowledge was still learned 
• learning occurred during the exam 
The main disadvantages were -  
• examinees lost time in the exam using the materials 
• learning of the materials was reduced 
• irrelevant answers 
 
Francis also reports that some studies show no difference in achievement levels between open 
book and traditional examinations, and attributed this to the fact that in many studies the open 
book examination questions 'were not designed to exploit the advantages of the open-book 
situation' (1982, p.15).  He quotes other studies which show that weaker candidates performed 
better in open book than in traditional examinations, and that open book assessment assisted 
students' recall more than their ability to deploy higher skills; but Francis points out that these 
results may have occurred because those studies used multiple choice examinations which 
assessed factual knowledge.  He notes that many of the studies agreed with Bacon (1969) that  
the open-book examination makes straight the way to a greater concentration on ideas 
and concepts, on methods and development, whilst reducing the body of knowledge that 
needs to be remembered for an examination, and which will probably not need to be 
retained after the examination. (1969, p.363; quoted Francis, p.15)2 
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The body of Francis' article evaluated the findings from a pilot scheme initiated by The 
Associated Examining Board.  The scheme set out to test the effectiveness of open book 
assessment in literature courses.  It consisted of an alternative syllabus and open-book 
examination in English Literature at Advanced Level, and candidates' work in this syllabus 
was compared to the work of candidates who took the traditional syllabus and examination.  
Subject experts drew up a list of four criteria on which to judge the work of the two sets of 
candidates.  These criteria were -  
1. working knowledge of the text 
2. understanding of the literary qualities of the text 
3. perception and personal response to the text 
4. formal presentation of work and the quality of written English (Francis, pp.17-18) 
Subject experts were asked to grade marks on a scale A to F, according to their assessment of 
merit.  In addition, students and teachers who took the alternative syllabus were asked to 
comment on the teaching and learning process.   
 
Francis reports that in general, the alternative candidates attained a higher standard of 
achievement over all the four criteria above, with criterion 1 exhibiting the greatest 
differential, and criterion 3 exhibiting the least.  He also reports that 'it was the candidates 
who achieved the high grades, that is the more able students, who appeared to benefit most 
from the open-book environment' (p.24).  Francis also gives us some of the views of the 
participants in the experiment, and these give interesting insights into the practices of both 
teachers and students.  The majority of teachers thought that open-book examinations had 
changed their teaching practice, so that they focused more on encouraging students' skills of 
literary analysis - the deep learning skills - as opposed to the more superficial skills of factual 
knowledge and crammed rote learning.  Rather surprisingly, candidates reported that they still 
memorised details of the set texts, citing the need to locate details quickly in the text as a 
reason for still doing this.  Most candidates also annotated their texts, which they were 
allowed to do.  The annotation took various forms from simple underlining to marginalia to 
summaries and extended notes in longhand.  Candidates prepared for the examination by a 
variety of methods - by repeated reading, writing model answers and identifying themes and 
issues in the texts that could be raised in examination questions.  Having the texts to hand was 
a boost to their confidence, they felt, but students were wary of the complacency that the 
presence of the texts could engender. (pp.21-24)   
 
These findings are illuminating, particularly for heavily text-based subjects .  Francis' 
evaluation of the Associated Board's findings highlighted two key issues.  First, if open-book 
examinations are to function as appropriate instruments of assessment, the objectives of the 
syllabus they assess ought to be at least re-considered and perhaps altered to match the new 
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assessment environment.  The Associated Board recognised this implicitly when they set an 
alternative syllabus which the open-book examinations assessed.  Second, if the examination 
method is to succeed in allowing candidates to perform to the best of their ability, both 
students and staff must recognise that changes need to be made to their teaching and learning 
practice.  This in turn involves staff reviewing their models of learning which they apply to 
the course they are teaching.   
 
 
Mnemosyne and the Law 
The key issue for legal academics is of course memory, for open-book examinations appear to 
absolve students from the drudgery of committing large tracts of the law to memory, to allow 
them to copy from cases and statutes and crib what others have written.  Examinations thus 
become easier to pass; standards appear to fall; students' learning is perceived as shallower 
because less knowledge is being absorbed.  Whether open-book examinations encourages 
what appears to be at first glance shallow learning is at least debatable - Francis' study showed 
that it is not the case, and that students' changed learning patterns demonstrated their 
sophisticated response to the new regime - but in the domain of legal studies there is a further 
dimension to the issue.   
 
Memory has for long held a privileged place in legal education.  If there has been resistance to 
the concept of open-book examinations among legal academics it rests on this point more than 
any other.  The resistance is a cultural one stemming from the very roots of our European 
legal educational tradition.  Indeed, the requirement to memorise law has influenced the ways 
in which it is ordered and delivered within the legal curriculum to such a deep cultural extent 
that we are scarcely aware of its power.  This hegemonic tradition has involved students 
committing to memory large tracts of substantive law in order to demonstrate mastery over it.  
To enable law to be taught and learned rationally, academics divide and sub-divide it into 
zones and hierarchies.  The enterprise is one familiar to all faculties of the academy of course, 
'the generic one of presenting a discourse so as to make it amenable to understanding and 
memory: ... for “method is the chiefest help of memory, [and] instructions for memory, if they 
belong to any art, must needs be logical”’ (Fraunce, 1588, quoted Goodrich, 1990, pp.32-3).  
Knowledge memorised becomes knowledge transferred, from lecture or text to student, and 
applied by student to problem question during assessment.  By memorising the law, the 
tradition has it, students subsume law, become it, enter into the profession.3  Without the body 
of memorised text, law students cannot function as a member of a professional caste.  The 
foundational nature of this experience, however - almost a rite de passage of sorts and 
powerfully experienced as such by students - is rarely made overt, and almost never discussed 
as part of the substantive legal curriculum.   
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Many of the cultural assumptions we make today about memory and legal education are based 
on practices that began in medieval universities.  Indeed, we can trace the central role of 
memory in legal education to the early role played by memory in pre-print cultures.  Such 
cultures created highly elaborated semiotic structures based upon the primacy of memory.  
Thus, for Quintilian, memory was an essential component in learning, and its processes were 
embedded in and facilitated by the art of rhetorical division.  In his practical guide, the 
Institutio, he recommends the use of punctuation - cola, commata and periodi - to divide up 
texts into clauses which can be more easily memorised; and he advocates the use of notae, 
short-hand marks and abbreviations.4  These marks were taught in medieval universities as a 
specific skill, the ars notataria, one that was also implicitly an ars memorativa, for memorial 
notae were often used as mnemonics for concording texts.  Using the iconography of 
Christian devotional texts, memory was habitually described by writers on rhetoric as a 
storehouse, a treasure chest, dovecote, beehive, an Ark of Noah amongst many other 
metaphors.  But these figures were used as mnemonics, dynamically and interactively: 
memory was regarded as an active synthesising and creative force.5  In medieval scribal 
culture, text was often formatted to enable a reader to memorise it and the style and form of 
legal texts in the middle ages was influenced by such mnemonic concerns.  The Decretum, for 
example, was set out in divisions, which were referenced by a number followed by the 
introductory word or phrase of the referenced canon.6  We might compare the form of the 
Decretum to a modern statute or case report.  The latter documents have rhetorical structures 
devised to enable a reader to understand key information and access it rapidly, but neither 
statute nor report is set out in a form, which would encourage mnemonic engagement with the 
text.7   
 
We can see the same concern for mnemonic taxis in medieval legal educational practice.  The 
fifteenth-century Italian jurist Peter of Ravenna declared of his lecturing practice -  
I daily read all of my lectures of Canon Law without a book; but if I should have a book 
before my eyes, I deliver the textual concordances and glosses from memory so that I 
should not seem to omit the least syllable. (quoted Carruthers, p.162) 
Peter's technique sounds paradoxical, to say the least.  He 'reads' (his memory) without a 
book; and when he has a book to hand, he reads his memory because he trusts it more than the 
text.  His words illustrate the difference between our print culture and a trained mnemonic 
method situated in the context of a scribal literary culture, for Peter mistrusts the possibly 
corrupt text and puts more faith in the highly elaborated structures of memory.  In a print 
culture, of course, the situation is the reverse: the book dominates as the uncorrupted and 
objective source.   
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In Glasgow University's Hunterian Museum there is a fine example of the primacy of 
memory in medieval university assessment, and its powerful legacy to Renaissance and 
modern legal education.  Included in an exhibition of the university’s history is a wooden 
chair called the Blackstone Chair, made around 1700.  In the base of the chair is a block of 
black marble, and mounted on the chair-back, above the sitter's head, is an hourglass.  
Generations of students were called to oral examinations on this chair.  At the start of the 
examination, the bedellus inverted the hour-glass and shouldered his mace, until the sand in 
the upper glass, hidden to the student but visible to the questioning masters, disappeared into 
the lower one, 'when he grounded his mace with the word 'Fluxit' ('It has passed through') and 
observed, 'Ad alium, Domine' ('Next, sir!')'.  (Durkan & Kirk, 1977, pp.93; 100) 
 
But the procedure of oral examination goes back further than the chair itself.  Durkan and 
Kirk suggest that the origin of the name of the Chair goes back to the practice in continental 
medieval universities of 'triers' or examiners expressing their opinion of a candidate: little 
black stones for ignorance, white ones for knowledge.  In the fifteenth century Glasgow 
University, students who read for their bachelor degree in Arts (a type of foundation course, 
and a prerequisite for students who wished to study law) had to pass this oral examination 
before they were allowed to proceed to the next examination diet.  The triers consisted of four 
masters, two internal (ad infra) and two external (ad extra).  Each student was questioned 
closely on two categories of text - ordinary books (roughly the equivalent of our prescribed 
texts), and extraordinary books (recommended or suggested reading).  They were asked to 
give definitions and expand on their applications.  Again, there is evidence even at this early 
date that the examinations were timed.8   
 
One can appreciate why memory and oral assessment dominated in a culture with relatively 
few texts available to students and masters; but that it lasted well into the print cultures of the 
Renaissance and modern periods is a more complex matter.9  Indeed, it has lasted until the 
present day in some sectors of university assessment, especially postgraduate thesis 
assessment.  We can understand this ascendancy if we appreciate that the oral examination 
can be a thorough form of examination precisely because it is not merely a test of memory.  
Students need to be able to define and distinguish propositions, to express themselves 
cogently, to understand, memorise and recall strings of arguments and definitions in oral 
disputations, and above all to manipulate knowledge at will.  All of these skills within the 
legal domain are lawyerly skills, in that lawyers practise them constantly in offices and in 
court, and they are revived in contemporary legal curricula as key skills, transferable skills 
and the like. 
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These skills are highly rhetorical, however; and it is here that we must draw the contrasts 
between the mnemonic activities of medieval law students and the activities preparatory to 
examinations carried out by contemporary law students.  Principally, in modern legal 
education, the curricular links between memory, rhetoric and the law are weak.  This is a 
fairly broad generalisation, of course, but it is probably true to say that whereas medieval 
educationalists and jurists understood and worked within a complex mnemonic culture, we 
post-moderns have lost the strong links that existed then between memory, writing process 
and legal practice, and education.  Our students are seldom trained to use mnemonic 
techniques in their reading; instruction in modern forms of legal rhetoric appears in most 
curricula, late on towards the professional training stage; while in our traditional closed book 
assessments substantive law eclipses other components.  Nowadays, our law students are 
required to memorise in an educational environment and print culture that does little to 
support that mnemonic activity.  The mysterious Other that students wrestle with in the 
examination hall is Mnemosyne, memory itself.   
 
Moreover, many of the recent reforms in legal education, particularly in assessment and 
curriculum, have been grounded in the recognition that if, in the last half century or so, the 
production and exchange of legal culture and information has undergone remarkable change, 
so forms of teaching and assessment ought to adapt to accommodate this.  All of the major 
reports on legal education have commented on the process of this change.  In 1980 the Royal 
Commission on Legal Services in Scotland, for example, was critical of the heavy reliance 
placed on rote learning of statute law and leading cases in assessments, and recommended that 
this traditional dependence be reduced, especially with regard to problem-solving questions.  
It is clear from the wording of its recommendation that the Commission saw open-book 
examinations as no easy option for students, but as a more efficient way of assessing them 
according to the principles of practice-oriented learning.  The Commission's recommendations 
regarding the professional practice of lawyers in 1980s, have relevance not only for lawyers, 
but also law-related employment in the late 1990s such as that of social workers, surveyors 
and trading standards officers: 
 
We do not think that rote learning in such a framework is of particular value; in such 
circumstances a 50 per cent or 70 per cent success rate is considered adequate for 
examination purposes, but such a performance in professional practice would be 
unacceptable.  Although some courses in some law faculties set examinations for which 
students will have access to statute and standard texts, much as they would expect to 
have in a professional firm, there is a strong case for requiring all students to sit at least 
some examinations on this basis; and we so recommend.  The pass standard should be 
raised accordingly.10 
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The Diploma in Trading Standards examination: a case-study 
The subtleties involved in designing and implementing open-book examinations can be 
illustrated by a case-study, that of the Diploma in Trading Standards (DTS) examinations.  
These public examinations are administered by the DTS Council through the Local 
Government Management Board (LGMB), and the candidates are trainee Trading Standards 
Officers (TSOs), employed full-time by local authorities and on block release to local higher 
education centres which teach the Part 1 and Part 2 exams of the Diploma.11  For the most part 
the candidates are mature students, including graduates (occasionally, LLB graduates).  The 
three-year Diploma curriculum is postgraduate standard overall, and contains an unusual 
blend of areas of knowledge, including law, economics, statistics, quality assurance, science 
and materials, principles of measurement, professional practice, and enforcement and advice.  
The law components predominate, and comprise general constitutional and EC law, and in 
considerably more detail, consumer law and the more specialist law of Weights and Measures.  
This reflects the situation in Trading Standards practice: the body of legal information TSOs 
have to deal is not a small one, with approximately 45 statutes and over 1,000 sets of 
Regulations, Orders and Codes of Practice.  Unlike full-time undergraduate students, the 
Diploma students work closely in their offices with the law upon which they are being 
examined.  They bring to the classes a familiarity with the law arising out of their work with 
criminal procedure in trading standards enforcement, and their roles of consultants to traders 
and arbitrators in consumer disputes.  The Diploma is thus a professional training course as 
well as an academic course.   
 
If the curriculum is an interesting blend of the academic and professional, until recently the 
form of assessment in the law papers has been traditional - for the most part a series of three-
hour unseen examinations.  Legal academics and TSOs set and mark the papers for these 
examinations, which contain the typical mixture of problem scenarios and questions requiring 
description of law.12  In 1994, however, for the first time in the history of the examination, 
candidates sitting the four law papers of the Diploma in Trading Standards were allowed to 
use statute books in the examinations.   
The DTS open book debate 
The decision to hold open-book examinations was first proposed publicly at a meeting of the 
Syllabus Review Group at Ambleside in 1991.  This group consisted of legal academics and 
TSOs and members of the DTS Council.  Later, because of concern expressed by lecturers at 
the teaching sites an initial meeting was held at Birmingham University and a further meeting 
at the LGMB centre in London to discuss implementation of the proposal.  At the last meeting 
a vigorous debate ensued, at the end of which it was decided in principle that students would 
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be allowed to use two copies of statute collections in the Diploma law examinations, and that 
the copies were to be 'clean' - that is, without sidelining, highlighting or annotation.  The 
changes to assessment would be effected in the then current year: this meant that the DTS Part 
2 students had completed nearly half of their 18 months-long course by the time they were 
informed of the change.  It was also decided to review the success of the assessment format in 
the near future. 
 
The central point of the debate concerned the practical implementation of a 'clean' or blank 
open book format.  It was acknowledged that the two collections of statutes chosen as open 
book texts did not contain all the statutes used in the course - Weights and Measures Act 
1985, Food Safety Act 1990, Medicines Act 1986, Agriculture Act 1970 and European 
Communities Act 1972 for example.13  In addition, subordinate legislation in Regulations and 
Orders, together with Codes of Practice and the like were not contained in the collections (this 
body of applicable subordinate legislation forms a substantial part of the DTS curriculum, for 
TSOs use it extensively in their work; and students are required to have a working knowledge 
of it).  Moreover, the two collections of statutes are based on English law: no special 
provision was made for Scottish students, who would thus sit the examination at some 
disadvantage to English students.   
 
Perhaps most significant in the wide-ranging discussion of open-book examinations was the 
absence of reference to the body of educational research carried out into open-book 
assessment.  Francis found twenty references in 1982, and drew on the findings of eleven for 
his summary of the literature.  None of this research literature found its way into the debate; 
nor was reference made to the wider context of educational research on assessment and 
memory and associated topics such as the nature of expertise, or the education of other 
professional groups.14  Legal academics as a group have in the past been notoriously 
uninterested in educational research and its practical application to the teaching of law.  This 
debate could be said to be one example of a situation which required careful consideration of 
the existing research before deciding which version of open-book assessment - if any - would 
be appropriate to the needs of students.15 
 
As a result the debate concerning the educational value of open-book assessment and its 
appropriateness to the education of TSOs was grounded on personal experiences of assessing 
students largely under a closed book system.  Those who favoured blank open book 
assessment with no notation at all were of the opinion that if students were allowed to make 
notes on their texts, they would not memorise essential elements of legal rules.  They held that 
the standard of the examination and of examinees would decline.  A key argument against 
notation of open books thus rested on the primacy of memory: TSOs, it was argued, required 
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to have memorised a considerable body of law because of the nature of their job.  If they 
discovered anything suspicious while visiting retail premises for example, they had to know 
what to do there and then, otherwise returning to the office to check up on the law could give 
a retailer the opportunity to remove evidence. 
 
This defence of blank open books was seen to be a persuasive one at the time, arguing as it 
did from the praxis of TSOs to draw apparently irrefutable conclusions about academic 
assessment of the knowledge required by a competent TSO.  But it could be said that the 
argument misconceives the nature of law examinations and the part played by memory within 
it.  First it equates the situation of the candidate in an exam with the situation wherein a TSO 
is confronted with a set of legal problems which he or she must solve instanter.  At best, law 
papers primarily examine the skills of legal analysis, as these are presented perforce in an 
artificial environment.  In the context of an LLB curriculum, for example, few legal 
academics nowadays would assent to the view that their exam questions are a direct 
preparation for the tasks of legal problem-solving which lawyers carry out in practice.16  
Written exams are not real-life legal practice, nor are they a direct preparation for it.  At best 
they can test a limited range of the skills of legal analysis.  This view is borne out by research: 
some theorists have pointed to the problematic relations between theory and praxis in 
professional education, while others have adopted a more extreme position in declaring that 
content knowledge has little bearing on occupational performance17.   
 
Secondly, learning to memorise the law is only one of the skills of legal analysis.  It is 
impossible to analyse the law without a knowledge of basic legal principles, of course; and to 
apply legal principles to practical problems one requires a memorised structure or taxis of 
principles.  But of itself and especially in the context of examined syllabi, rote learning can be 
a passive, inert rehearsal of information, which encourages docility in students.  As a form of 
memorising, it can degenerate into frantic exam cramming, wherein facts are superficially 
rehearsed for the exam and then largely forgotten after it.18  It might be said in fact that apart 
from the artificial mnemonic systems outlined above (used by very few students), the most 
deeply encoded memory traces are a result of interacting with the world in a meaningful way.  
Law examinations, with their highly artificial constraints and environment do not test this 
type of memory well: they cannot take on the role of flight simulators for TSOs.   
 
Indeed, it could be argued that the blank open book examination widens the gap between 
theoretical knowledge and praxis.  This interface is problematic in education, particularly in 
professional courses such as the Diploma in Trading Standards.  Frequently it appears as a 
question of transfer: namely, how does one effect transfer of knowledge from one domain or 
environment to another.  The argument put forward by proponents of blank open book 
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assessment (and it is close to the argument in support of traditional closed book assessment) 
is that memory-work is an essential component to the learning patterns of students: the 
absence of information in closed book examinations compels students to memorise legal rules 
and cases.  Furthermore they claim that memorisation supports transfer of learning from one 
domain to another, for in attempting to understand and memorise the material, students make 
many passes through it, and thus understand it at a deeper level than they would otherwise.   
 
This view has the merit of leaning on the indisputable point that students of law require to 
memorise basic legal principles.  But it does not represent the whole story, and in parts is 
contradicted by a substantial body of phenomenographic and cognitive research into memory 
and learning, which tells us that learning happens not by recording information, but by 
interpreting it.  Entwistle & Entwistle, for instance, (1992) have cast doubt on examination 
questions which appear to test a student's conceptual understanding of a subject ('Explain the 
term 'duty of care' as used in the law of negligence', for example).  They demonstrate that 
students can understand lecture notes without much active engagement with the ideas 
contained in the lectures, and without the ability to transfer this knowledge to other domains, 
or to use it to solve problems in novel situations.   
 
In research into reading processes, memory is similarly contextualised within interpretive 
processes.  Thus Kintsch pointed out that ‘being able to recall a piece of information is not a 
sufficient condition for being able to actively utilize this information for some other purpose’ 
(1986, pp. 841-51; 848).  Kintsch explains the difference in terms of what he calls ‘textbase’ 
and ‘situation model’.  Readers who formed an adequate textbase performed well on memory 
tasks.  They were able to reproduce the text, even to summarise it.  But readers whose 
situation model - that is, their knowledge of the external context of the remembered text - 
remained deficient, were unable to use the recalled text in tasks requiring inferential acts.  As 
Kintsch says, ‘there is an important difference between just remembering a text and learning 
from it to perform some kind of action’ (1986, p.849).19   
 
Taking a broader view of the research, if the link between memory and the ability to perform 
well in problem-solving is no longer seen as a direct one, there are claims that high levels of 
competence in expert performance result from the interaction between knowledge structure 
and processing abilities.  Three cognitive theories of learning are relevant here, all of them 
attempting to describe how learning takes place and how transfer is effected in expert 
performance.  In the first, learning is seen as a process of knowledge construction, not 
knowledge absorption.  This theory focuses on the constructive mental activity which takes 
place in the learner, and emphasises that meaning is 'rooted in, and indexed by, experience' 
rather than the teacher-centred bias and mastery learning of many classical instructional 
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strategies (Duffy & Jonassen, 1992, p.4).20  The second theory states that learning is 
knowledge-dependent and knowledge-driven.  In this theory learners use current knowledge 
to understand new knowledge by using elaborative processes and forming relationships 
between items of old and new knowledge.  The key to expert performance, according to this 
theory, lies in identifying and learning effective elaborative processes.21  The third theory 
(especially relevant to professional and vocational learning) concerns itself with situated 
knowledge, and posits that both knowledge and skills cannot viably be separated from the 
social and mental context in which they are practised.  If learning, and especially transfer of 
learning is to be effective, then it could be argued that it ought to be organised so as to reflect 
the conditions of practice (Brown et al, 1989).   
 
In its operation and effect, the blank open book examination cuts across the bows of all three 
theories.  This type of assessment presents students with texts they do not 'own' - the text 
stands resolute and alienating in its blankness, without the glosses, marginalia, post-its and the 
many other devices of idiosyncratic ars notataria which contemporary students and 
professionals alike use to create from a text their own personal webs of meaning.  This 
distance may serve, as we shall see, to heighten, not reduce, students’ anxiety about 
assessment.  Furthermore, the text itself is not a situated text: it could be argued that it does 
not contribute effectively to the students' construction of knowledge.  And if it does not 
enable a student to solve a legal problem in an assessment it can become, for the student, part 
of the problem of learning the law.22 
 
Student response to the blank open book examination 
The response of my own students studying for the DTS Part 2 examinations was significant.23  
They were dismayed by the decision of the DTS to hold blank open book examinations, and 
would have preferred a truly open book context in which they could use notated texts, as did 
the students in Francis' study.   
 
One might have expected that the change from traditional unseen examination to open-book 
would involve significant change in patterns of student learning.  In reality, little change took 
place; and this could be attributed to the form of the blank open-book assessment.  As was 
pointed out above, the open books did not contain all the necessary statutes and Regulations.  
Moreover, students still felt they had to memorise the 'clean' statutes if only because they 
were unsure whether they would have time in the examination to flick through the collections 
searching for particular sections.  They also recognised that the structure of the statute 
together with definitions and cross-references still had to be learned, and for them the simplest 
way to do this was to memorise sections and their contents.  They were not prepared, halfway 
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through the Part 2 course, to change methods of examination preparation, which had served 
them well in past traditional examinations.   
 
Their attitude here is revealing, if at first glance paradoxical.  They distrusted the accessibility 
of the statutes and preferred to treat the open-book exam as if it were a traditional assessment.  
Their distrust of text both parallels and contrasts with that of Peter of Ravenna, quoted above.  
The medieval jurist and twentieth century students would - for very different reasons - prefer 
to use their memories; but given the free choice of blank text or notated text, the students 
unhesitatingly chose the latter.  They were in fact treating the blank texts as part of the 
assessment's difficulty, not as an aid to solving problems.   
 
If students distrusted the new regime, it was partly because it gave confusing signals to them.  
For example, regulations, which follow the Consumer Protection Act 1987, were not included 
in the prescribed texts, but the CPA itself was.  Did this mean, students wondered, that they 
had to memorise the minutiae of the regulations while leaving the general and fundamental 
principles of Consumer Safety legislation unmemorised?  This could lead to the situation 
where, because a student may have forgotten a regulation, an examiner could be unable to 
discern whether a student had understood and could apply the principles of the CPA.  Indeed, 
there is merit in the argument that the procedure should have been reversed: it might have 
been more appropriate to allow access to the regulations in open book form, and test students' 
understanding of the general principles of Consumer Safety law, its fundamental definitions, 
rights, obligations, remedies and defences.  These, after all, change little over a span of years, 
while the regulations may change more frequently.  In discussion with students on the matter 
it was clear that they considered the style of the DTS open book examination, and therefore 
their learning patterns, had been dictated by the availability of published statute collections.  
These collections do have the merit of imposing consistency of textual access upon all 
students sitting the examinations.  Nevertheless, students sensed - without saying so in as 
many words - that there was an absence of consideration of the meta-curricular planning 
issues that ought to guide the diagnostic assessment of cognitive skills in domain expertise. 
 
A comparison with the responses of students in Francis' study is revealing.  There, students 
adapted their traditional learning patterns and individual styles to study more effectively in the 
new environment of the Alternative syllabus and open book assessment.  They did so because 
the syllabus encouraged them to do so, while the completely open nature of the assessment 
gave them the opportunity to plan, construct and demonstrate situated learning.  Furthermore, 
the climate of the syllabus acknowledged the complexity of the relationship between learning 
and assessment, its inherently problematic nature, and accommodated it, while the 'clean' 
blankness of the DTS examination implicitly denied it.   
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Alternatives to blank open book assessment 
So far, we have been examining one open-book model of assessment carried out in the DTS 
examinations.  But are there alternatives to it?   
 
Many law courses now allow students to take their notes into the examination room, with 
whatever annotation they care to make upon them.  One example will suffice.  I taught a first-
year module in Legal Skills, in the University Diploma in Legal Studies at Glasgow 
Caledonian University, in which students worked on legal research, reading and writing 
skills.  In the legal writing skills unit students focused largely on drafting discursive and 
problem-solving essays, and on achieving an understanding of the contexts of different legal 
genres and texts.  Assessment for the legal writing unit of the module was a three-hour 
entirely open-book examination consisting of unseen drafting and critique activities.  In the 
first year that the module ran, a short questionnaire was issued to all students (thirty-three in 
total) directly after the exam, asking for their feedback on what was for all of them a new 
form of assessment.  The results were an overwhelming endorsement of the assessment 
method.  Thirty-one students felt that the examination questions were an appropriate 
assessment of what they had learned during the module, and the same number again approved 
the entirely open-book nature of the assessment.  The following comments were indicative of 
their views: 
 
Essay type exams, in my view, provide a better view of student ability.  In 
reality, when working, law graduates will work with books, etc. 
 
This type of exam is good in that it enables you to see just what you have 
learned throughout the year 
 
Able to concentrate on format of essay rather than just facts.  Didn’t have to 
fill head with facts. 
 
Makes you feel more confident even if you didn’t use books in the exam.  
More relaxing, not so much pressure.  Could sleep the night before! 
 
These comments support Francis’ view of open book assessment quoted above.  Moreover it 
was clear that the relationship between the module syllabus and assessment was an essential 
component of this approval by students: they used the same materials in their learning as in 
their assessment; they had to take responsibility for deciding how to prepare for the 
examination; rote-learning was minimised; deep learning and understanding was prioritised.   
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Alternatives to the DTS Council's blank open book proposals do exist, therefore; but we can 
go further and look to the broader educational context of open-book assessment.  Within the 
last few decades, the rationale behind memorising great tracts of black letter law has been 
questioned, both in its theory and practice.  Foremost among the critics has been the skills-
based learning movement.  The movement is a broad church, unified by its dissatisfaction 
with the narrow base of traditional teaching styles, and relying at least in part on an 
interdisciplinary approach to teaching and learning, including cognitive psychology, 
phenomenography, situated learning, clinical legal skills education, contextual studies, and 
systematic instructional design to name but a few.24  Instead of dividing and sub-dividing 
zones of substantive law, this movement tends to analyse the skill components that underlie 
learning, and emphasise these instead of the weight of memorised black-letter law.  It also 
argues that integration of knowledge and skill, and transference of legal skills are crucial 
principles within the legal curriculum.  David Barnhizer reveals the link when he quotes 
David Ausubel as being for him the origin of the idea of a cognitive conceptual structure: 
Existing cognitive structure, that is, an individual's organisation, stability, and clarity of 
knowledge in a particular subject matter field at any given time, is the principal factor 
influencing the learning and retention of meaningful new material.  ...  When we 
deliberately attempt to influence cognitive structure so as to maximise meaningful learning 
and retention we come to the heart of the educative process. (Barnhizer, 1979, p.82, 
quoting Ausubel 1969)25   
 
The new movement is learner-centred rather than corpus-based (Adams & Brownsword, 
1992; Brayne, Duncan and Grimes, 1998).  It sites expertise not in substantive knowledge of 
law but in what the student does with legal information and within the structures of legal 
process.  Memory work plays a role here, but it is not pre-eminent.  It is often assessed as 
merely one of many components of lawyerly skill and knowledge.  The movement frequently 
sees the task of legal education holistically, as one that fuses professional and academic 
stages, skills and substantive knowledge.  It espouses 'a combination of knowledge, skills and 
attitudes that cannot be separated out into separate spheres and learnt in separate processes' 
(Jones, 1989, p.187).  It also uses less traditional forms of assessment: self- and peer-
assessment; video and role play, and entirely open book examinations. 
 
Two examples of the above are the approach adopted by the Faculty of Law at the University 
of Maastricht, and the Professional Legal Training Course run by the Law Society of British 
Columbia.  In the former, the Law Faculty took the lead offered by its sister Faculty of 
Medicine and adopted the influential approach of the Faculty of Medicine, McMaster 
University, in Hamilton, Ontario.  The Law Faculty's approach at Maastricht is characterised 
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by interdisciplinary education, problem-oriented education arranged thematically, skills 
training and, in the area of assessment, examinations and skills tests (Moust & Nuy, 1987; 
Cruickshank, 1996, pp.215-16).  In the British Columbia course, students were given 
'systematic and concentrated training' in skills (Jones, 1989, pp.176-7).  The course was 
assessed by five components - four skills assessments and an open-book examination.  In this 
examination students could use 'Practice Materials, Activity Plans, copies of statutes, Law 
Society Rules and Handbook, and their own notes and texts' (Jones, 1989, p.184).   
 
These approaches are quite different from that of the blank open book approach in the DTS 
law examinations.  While studying in that curriculum, students were already working in a 
context-rich professional office environment which inducted them into the procedural 
knowledge and skills required of a TSO.  When it came to assessment of legal knowledge and 
procedures, however, the blank open book examination altered the familiar boundaries of 
closed book assessment while still denying students the tools of their situated professional 
practices.   
 
 
Conclusion 
A debate about assessment, particularly in a curriculum as close to professional practice as is 
the Diploma in Trading Standards, inevitably involves issues such as learning objectives, 
teaching and learning styles, administrative practicability and the like.  Beneath these lie 
deeper issues: models of teaching and learning, and views of what the profession does and 
how best to prepare its practitioners.  At an even more foundational level, though, lie the 
meta-issues of theory and practice, and the relations between the two as these are interpreted 
by both universities and professional regulatory bodies.  What do they consider to be the 
relations between educational theory and practice?  What is their view of the theory of 
professional practice as applied to the experience of lived practice?  If educational theory and 
practice are to be effective in transferring students’ knowledge and skills to the sphere of 
practice, then these issues must be given serious attention.26   
 
For several decades now there has been wide-ranging discussion of just these questions.  
Researchers such as Schön, Argyris, Eraut, Boud and many others have been developing a 
sophisticated analysis of the ancient dualism between theory and practice.  According to 
Schön, the traditional ‘technical-rationality’ model, as he terms it, equates theory with 
knowledge and principles, and practice with merely 'instrumental problem-solving' (1987).  
This traditional model has little to say about transference or transformation of theory into 
practice: it is simply not seen as problematic.  For Schön, though, this issue is deeply 
problematic.  He reveals that practice rarely deals only with problem-solving: it also has to 
17 
construct problems in the midst of uncertain and ambivalent situations where such factors as 
agency, evidence, means and ends and probabilities are constantly shifting and perplexing 
variables.  In these situations, the traditional notion of applying theory to practice becomes at 
least unhelpful, at times an obstruction to effective practice.  In such circumstances theory 
about practice can, as Eraut points out, attain an oppressive hegemony within a profession, 
and may become a body of prescriptive concepts which, though widely circulated, and 
attaining the status of revered shibboleths, ‘offer no practical advantage’ to professional 
practice (Eraut, 1985, p.125; 1994). 
 
Over against the dualistic confrontation of theory and practice, Schön constructs an 
'epistemology of practice', a transactive model where knowledge or theory is constructed out 
of practice or experience, which in turn reacts with previously held knowledge of theory and 
practice.  Practitioners do so by engaging in reflection-on-action and reflection-in-action.  The 
former is the less effective form of reflection upon action, coming as it does post factum.  The 
latter, however, is a powerful method of engaging in analysis of practice through the 
mediation of theory.  In turn it can generate fresh knowledge and theory which is practice-
derived, but which enacts a dialectic with the content knowledge of formal theory. 
 
Schön's model of the relationship between theory and practice, elaborated, glossed and 
critiqued by many others in the field, is one example of the sophisticated analysis of the 
debatable lands between theory and practice.27  Any analysis such as Schön's has implications 
not only for the models of teaching and learning we hold, but also for the learning objectives 
we set and styles of teaching and learning we practise (Usher & Bryant, 1987, pp.205-6).  It 
also directly affects our preferences for assessment.  If, for example, we act according to a 
technical-rationality model in which doctrine and theory is separated out from and applied to 
practice, our preferences for assessment are liable to be for closed rather than open book; and 
for blank open book rather than notated open book.   If we hold by a model such as Schön's 
reflective practitioner, our preferences will be for assessment which contextualises legal 
doctrine and theory as much as possible in what Vygotsky defined as the zone of proximal 
development (1978).  But whatever model we espouse, and this is the most important point to 
arise from the open book debate outlined above, it is essential that we are clear about our 
choices and their implications, not only for our educational practice, but for the students who, 
after all our assessments and gradings are over, will be faced with the ever-present challenge 
of applying theory to practice in their own right.  What role models, we might ask ourselves, 
do our learning models and forms of assessment give them for their task of life-long learning? 
 
On a broader plane, the DTS open book debate exemplifies the contemporary shift in 
relations between the academy and professional bodies.28  For legal academics, the situation 
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outlined in footnote 15 above is altering rapidly.  New conditions of service and initiatives in 
teaching and learning (the rise in student numbers, the Funding Councils' Teaching Quality 
Assessment, QAA, benchmarking, the appearance of books, journals and websites 
specialising in legal education, and the Law Courseware Consortium TLTP amongst many 
factors) have begun to engineer change, to the extent that legal educational theory is now a 
more prominent feature in the curricular landscape of most university law schools.  As legal 
academics become more aware of the historical, cultural and educational resonance of their 
heuristics and assessment methods, so their dialogue with professional bodies over the nature 
of professional education, its content and delivery grows in sophistication. Such a dialogue 
has always existed, of course; but in future it will become increasingly influenced by research 
from other, adjacent disciplines, and by the debate regarding quality in education.29  As a 
consequence the nature of the consensus of aims and methods which had existed between the 
academy and professional bodies is being fashioned anew.  If carried out sensitively by both 
sides, this process will strengthen the essential relationship between the two and, one would 
hope, improve the quality of education for our students.   
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to Mr Tom Philpott, Trading Standards Officer Training 
Unit, and Ms Jayne Williams, lecturer in Consumer Studies Dept, Glasgow Caledonian 
University for their helpful comments on parts of this article; and to the anonymous reviewers 
for their constructive criticism. 
 
 
 
References 
 
ADAMS, J.N. & BROWNSWORD, R., (1992) Understanding Law (London: Fontana) 
ANDERSON, J.R. & FINCHAM, J.M., (1994) Acquisition of procedural skills from 
examples, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 20, 6, 1322-40 
AUSUBEL, D. (1969) Cognitive structure and the facilitation of meaningful verbal learning, 
Contemporary Issues in Educational Psychology, 189-211 
BACON, F. (1969) Open Book Examinations, Education and Training, September, 358-369 
BARNHIZER, D. (1979) The clinical method of legal instruction: its theory and 
implementation, Journal of Legal Education, 30, 67-148 
19 
BARRETT, B. (1990) What should we be learning about legal education?  The Law Teacher 
24, 1, 3-15 
BRAYNE, H., DUNCAN, N. and GRIMES, R. (1998) Clinical Legal Education: Active 
Learning in Your Law School (London, Blackstone Press) 
BRIGHT, S. (1991) What, and how, should we be teaching? The Law Teacher, 25, 1, 1-18 
BROWN, J.S. et al., (1989) Situated cognition and the culture of learning, Educational 
Researcher, 18, 32-42 
BROWNSWORD, R. (1996) Where are all the law schools going? Journal of the Association 
of Law Teachers, 30, 1, 1-25 
CARRUTHERS, M. (1990) The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Society, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature) 
CHI, M.T.H. & BASSOK, M. (1989) Learning from examples via self-explanations.  In 
Resnick, L. ed. Knowing, Learning and Instruction: Essays in Honor of Robert Glaser (New 
Jersey, Hillsdale) pp.251-83 
COLE, A.L. (1997) Impediments to reflective practice: towards a new agenda for research on 
teaching, Teachers and Teaching: Theory and Practice 3, 1, 7-27 
CRUICKSHANK, D. (1996) Problem-based learning in legal education.  In Webb, J. & 
Maughan, C. eds Teaching Lawyers’ Skills (London, Butterworths) 
DUFFY, T.M. & JONASSEN, D.H. (1992) eds Constructivism and the Technology of 
Instruction: a Conversation (Hillsdale, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum) 
DURKAN, J. & KIRK, J. (1977) The University of Glasgow 1451-1577 (Glasgow, 
University of Glasgow Press) 
ENTWISTLE, N. (1992) The Impact of Teaching on Learning Outcomes in Higher 
Education: A Literature Review (London, CVCP/USDU) 
ENTWISTLE, A.C. & ENTWISTLE, N. (1992) Experiences of understanding in revising for 
degree examinations, Learning and Instruction, 2, 1-22 
ENTWISTLE, N. & ENTWISTLE, A. (1991) Developing, Revising and Examining 
Conceptual Understanding in Degree Courses: The Student Experience and its Implications 
(Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh) 
ENTWISTLE, N. & MARTON, F. (1994) Knowledge objects: understandings constituted 
through intensive academic study, British Journal of Educational Psychology, 64, 161-178 
ERAUT, M. (1985) Knowledge creation and knowledge use in professional contexts, Studies 
in Higher Education, 10, 117-37 
ERAUT, M. (1994) Developing Professional Knowledge and Competence (London, The 
Falmer Press) 
FEBVRE, L. & MARTIN, H-J. (1984) The Coming of the Book: The Impact of Printing 
1450-1800, eds Nowell-Smith, G. & Wootton, D., trans. Gerard, D. (second edition, London, 
Verso) 
20 
FRANCIS, J. (1982) A Case for open-book examinations, Educational Review 34, 1, 13-26 
FRAUNCE, A. (1588) Lawiers Logike (London) 
GLASER, R. (1984) Education and thinking: the role of knowledge, American Psychologist, 
39, 93-103 
GLASER, R. (1986) On the nature of expertise, in Klix, F. & Hagendorf, H., eds, Human 
Memory and Cognitive Capabilities: Mechanisms and Performances (North-Holland, 
Elsevier Science Publishers B.V) 
GOLD, N. (1989) The Professional Legal Training Program: towards training for 
competence, The Advocate, 10, 1-12 
GOODRICH, P. (1987a) Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal 
Analysis (London, Macmillan) 
GOODRICH, P. (1987b) Psychoanalysis in legal education: notes on the violence of the sign.  
In Kevelson, R. ed Law and Semiotics, vol 1, (New York, Plenum Press) 
GOODRICH, P. (1990) Languages of Law: From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks, 
(London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson) 
GRABINGER R.S. & DUNLAP, J.C. (1995) Rich Environments for active learning: a 
definition, Association for Learning Technology Journal, 3, 2-37 
GRESTY, G. (1997) Delivering the professional qualification into the millennium: the review 
of the Diploma in Trading Standards, Trading Standards Review, March, 12-13 
HEALY, A.F. & BOURNE, Jnr, L.E. (1995) eds Learning and Memory of Knowledge and 
Skills: Durability and Specificity (London, Sage) 
JOHNSTONE, R., PATTERSON, J. and RUBENSTEIN, K. (1998) Improving Criteria and 
Feedback in Student Assessment in Law (London, Cavendish) 
JONES, P. (1989) A skills-based approach to professional legal education - an exemplary 
case, Journal of the Association of Law Teachers, 23, 2, 12-24 
KINTSCH, W. (1986) Memory for prose.  In Klix, F. & Hagendorf, H., eds, Human Memory 
and Cognitive Capabilities: Mechanisms and Performances, (North Holland, Elsevier 
Science Publishers, B.V) 
KISSAM, P.C. (1989) Law school examinations,  42 Vanderbilt Law Review 433-472 
KLEMP, G.O. (1977) Three Factors of Success in the World of Work: Implications for 
Curriculum Planning in Higher Education (Boston, McBer) 
LANDOW, G. (1992) Hypertext: The Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory and 
Technology (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press) 
LAW SOCIETY (1995) Announcement on Qualifying Law Degrees (London, Law Society of 
England and Wales) 
LE BRUN, M. and JOHNSTONE, R. (1994) The Quiet (R)evolution: Improving Student 
Learning in Law (Sydney, The Law Book Company) 
MACKIE, K. (1990) A strategy for legal education research, The Law Teacher, 24, 1-17 
21 
MAHARG, P, McDONNELL, T., STONELY, P. (1997) The Review of the Diploma in 
Trading Standards, unpublished contract research (LGMB/ITSA) 
MOUST, J.C. & HUY, H.J. (1987) Preparing teachers for a problem-based, student-centered 
law course, Journal of Professional Legal Education, 5, 19-25 
NEWBLE, D.I., JAEGER, K. (1983) The Effect of Assessments and Examinations on the 
Learning of Medical Students, Medical Education, 17, 25-31 
NORTH, R., (1650/1824) A Discourse on the Study of the Laws (London, T. White) 
OLSON, D.R. (1994) The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of 
Writing and Reading (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) 
PALIWALA, A. (1999) Learning in Cyberspace, BILETA Annual Conference, BILETA 99: 
Cyberspace 1999: Crime, Criminal Justice and the Internet: An International Conference, 
March 1999, http://www.bileta.ac.uk  
PEARCE, D., CAMPBELL, E., and HARDING, D. (1987) Australian Law Schools: A 
Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission: A Summary 
and Vols 1-4 (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service) 
PIRIE, A.J. (1987) Objectives in legal education: the case for systematic instructional design, 
Journal of Legal Education, 37, 576-97 
QUINTILIAN, M.F. (1920-24) The Institutio Oratorio of Quintilian, trans. by H.E. Butler, 4 
vols (London, Heinemann) 
RAMSDEN, P. (1992) Learning to Teach in Higher Education (London, Routledge) 
Royal Commission on Legal Education in Scotland (1980), Command Papers 7846 
SAMPFORD, C. (1998) Rethinking the core curriculum.  In Goldring, J., Sampford, C., 
Simmonds, R., New Foundations in Legal Education (London, Cavendish) 
SCHÖN, D. (1987) Educating the Reflective Practitioner: Toward a New Design for 
Teaching and Learning in the Professions. (London, Jossey-Bass Publishers) 
THEOPHILIDES, C. and DIONYSIOU, O. (1996) The major functions of the open book 
examination at the university level: a factor analytic study, Studies in Educational 
Evaluation, 22, 2, 157-70 
THOMAS, P. (1986) The Structures and Stability of Learning Approaches, unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Queensland, Australia.  
TODDINGTON, S (1996) The emperor’s new skills: the academy, the profession and the 
idea of legal education.  In Birks, P.B.H., ed. What are Law Schools For? (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press) 
TONFONI, G & RICHARDSON, J.(1994) Writing as a Visual Art, (London, Intellect) 
TWINING, W. (1994) Blackstone's Tower: The English Law School (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell) 
TWINING, W. (1997) Law in Context: Enlarging a Discipline (Oxford, Clarendon Press) 
22 
USHER, R.S. & BRYANT, I (1987) Re-examining the theory-practice relationship in 
continuing professional education, Studies in Higher Education, 12, 2, 201-212 
VYGOTSKY, L.S. (1978) Mind in Society: the Development of Higher Psychological 
Processes, M. Cole et al., eds, (Cambridge MASS. Harvard University Press) 
WEBB, J. & MAUGHAN, C. (1996) eds Teaching Lawyers’ Skills (London, Butterworths) 
                                                
1 Brownsword (1996) inquires along similar lines when he states that ‘whilst the views of the professional 
bodies obviously merit respect, academic lawyers need an independent foundation for their view of the essential 
mission of the university law school’ (p.5).  For him, the dichotomy between professional bodies’ ‘foundational 
objectives’ such as that contained in the Law Society’s Announcement on Qualifying Degrees and law school 
mission statements requires law schools to return to first principles, to the purpose of a university and a law 
school (ibid, pp.4-5). 
2 A point raised by Theophilides & Dionysiou (1996) 
3 This is a common trope in legal educational texts.  See for example North (1650/1824) - ‘[students] must not 
only read and talk, but eat, drink and sleep law’ (p.7) 
4 Institutio Oratoria, I, I, 36 
5 For a subtle analysis of this, see Carruthers (1990) pp.36-7; 112-13.  For an example of such mnemonic figures 
analysed by Carruthers, see her description of Hugh of St Victor's 'De arca Noe morali' (pp 208-11).   
6 Ibid, p.99.  As Carruthers points out, the development of the prose cursus, 'used in administrative and legal 
writing especially, is probably a related aid for the trained notarius' (p.317).  Goodrich (1987a) raised the 
general historical question of the loss of the rhetorical disciplines in Part II of his book: ‘[t]he history in question 
is that of the repression and exclusion of rhetorical and “topical” contingencies, largely coincident with the rise 
of the empiricist and rationalist philosophies of the seventeenth century’ (p.88).  Goodrich goes on to trace 
within the history of rhetoric the loss of ‘the study of the historicity of discourse’, its separation from philosophy 
and its condemnation to ‘the triviality of the purely verbal’ (p.107) 
7 This could be said to apply to the physical form of the book as well as layout of the text.  As George Landow 
and many others have pointed out with regard to early European publishers, the pagination, tables of contents, 
and indices which we take for granted in printed books took approximately a century to develop after the 
introduction of printing.  As is the case with alphabetisation, the function of such indices is primarily that of 
information retrieval, not the mnemonic retrieval characteristic of manuscript culture.  The process of historical 
change in reading habits brought about by this fundamental shift from mnemonic recall to information retrieval 
is well described in Landow (1992), pp. 30-31; 54-56, and 188-89 
8 According to Durkan and Kirk, Students also had to give an undertaking before the examination started that if 
they received black stones from the masters they would not attack them or otherwise injure them ... 
9 For illustration of the close links between universities and early print cultures, see Febvre & Martin (1984) 
chapters 4 & 8.  For a discussion of the effect of print culture on the relations of writing and memory, see Olson 
(1994)  
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10 Vol 1, 16.24.  This has been echoed by key reports since then throughout common law jurisdictions.  See, for 
example, Pearce et al (1987) In recommending particular forms of assessment the Hughes Commission went 
further than the Ormrod Committee, which had already 'encouraged innovation and experiment in respect of 
curriculum, teaching methods and research' (Twining, 1994, p.37) 
11 The LGMB is now the Improvement and Development Agency for Local Government 
12 There are a number of exceptions to this traditional assessment: papers 12 and 13, which contain strong 
elements of practice-based law, two workbooks, and the project which students are also required to submit, are 
based firmly upon practice-based issues 
13 Later it was agreed that students would be permitted to take ‘clean’ (ie unannotated) copies of statutes into the 
examination, together with a copy of the Code of Practice for Traders on Price Indications.  However, this 
caused particular difficulties for students as regards amended legislation (I am indebted to Jayne Williams for 
this information).   
14 On the subject of expertise, for example, see the review article by Glaser, Robert, (1986).  Glaser's list of 
twenty-four summary propositions (pp.926-8) is a good general and historical introduction to the cognitive 
research base on the interaction between knowledge structure and processing abilities. 
15 Barrett notes that in a conference paper William Twining observed that in the debates on professional legal 
competency and training, '"almost none of the protagonists have any competence in educational theory."’ (1990, 
p.5)  As Barrett goes on to point out, 'debates on curriculum content have hitherto given relatively little 
consideration to the learning process as opposed to identifying the range of information to be imparted' (p.6).  
See also Bright (1991), who points out that the 'traditional approach [to teaching and learning law] is coupled 
with, and may be explained by, the absence of serious epistemological debate on law teaching' (p.11).  Mackie 
(1990) commented that 'there is wide agreement that legal education research has presented a fairly bleak 
picture in terms of its quantity or its impact on educational practice' (p.132).  As a result of this historical lack of 
interest shown by legal academics in legal education as a serious legal topos, students exhibit the same apathy.  
Peter Goodrich has pointed out that 'there are in all probability few topics of controversy that are of less interest 
to their recipients than the discussion of legal education is to the students of law.  Education is a given' (p.195). 
16 See, for example, Sampford (1998), quoting Flinders University of South Australia Law Handbook 1997: 
‘”No LLB programme can or should aspire to produce a graduate who is immediately a ‘complete’ lawyer”’ 
(p.130) 
17See for example Eraut, M. (1985), and Klemp, (1977) 
18 An interesting analogy for the comparison between rote learning and thinking was made by Marvin Minsky -  
An idea with a single sense can lead you along only one track.  Then, if anything goes wrong, it just gets 
stuck, a thought that sits there in your mind with nowhere to go.  that's why, when a person learns 
something 'by rote', that is, with no sensible connections, we say that they 'don't really understand'.  Rich 
meaning-networks, however, give you many different ways to go: if you can't solve a problem one way, 
you can try another.  True, too many indiscriminate connections will turn a mind to mush.  But well-
connected meaning-structures let you turn ideas around in your mind, to consider alternatives and 
24 
                                                
envision things from many perspectives until you find one that works.  And that's what we mean by 
thinking! 
Tonfoni & Richardson (1994), p.15 (Foreword by Marvin Minsky) 
19 See also Anderson & Fincham (1994), p.1322: ‘[The] view that declarative knowledge was a prerequisite to 
procedural knowledge has been criticised’.  Anderson and Fincham then go on to discuss the body of literature, 
inter alia Berry & Broadbent, who show that ‘subjects can learn to successfully manipulate a rule-based system 
but cannot consciously state the rules.  They interpret this to mean that procedural knowledge is acquired 
without first going through declarative knowledge’.  A similar point has been made by others with regard to skill 
learning.  As one recent book on the subject has it, ‘[h]ighly practised skill learning will be durable when the 
test of retention embodies the procedures employed during acquisition’ (Healy & Bourne, 1995) 
20 Duffy & Jonassen (1992) p.4.  They draw upon a number of different cognitive learning theories, especially 
situated cognition - see Brown et al., (1989) 
21 See for example Glaser (1984); Chi & Bassok (1989)  
22 Though they do not discuss open book examinations in detail, Le Brun & Johnstone (1994) make a similar 
point regarding other aspects of written exams.  They criticise the ‘objectivism’ of this assessment, quoting 
Kissam (1989): ‘The objectivism of law school examinations allows [us] to limit [our] engagement with both 
the teaching and evaluation of [our] students.  The marked discontinuities between classroom work and 
examination work and the use of quantitative methods to … grade law school examinations are the primary 
means by which we achieve this disengagement’ (p.204).  Curiously enough, as Le Brun and Johnstone point 
out, again quoting Kissam, there is more resemblance between the informational structures of examination 
answers written by students and oral communications than there is between the examination answers and the 
variety of written genres used in legal practice (p.205) 
23 Student response was articulated in action research interviews carried out with members of the class. 
24 The literature is too substantial to attempt even a representative sample here, but the following are illustrative.  
Le Brun & Johnstone (1994), Twining (1997) Webb & Maughan (1996) Brown et al., (1989), Barnhizer (1979), 
Barrett (1990), Pirie (1987), Grabinger & Dunlap (1995), Paliwala (1999) 
25 Ausubel (1969), p.199 
26 Though I do not share his conclusions, Stuart Toddington (1996, p.82) has described this point well when he 
writes that ‘[w]hat constitutes good practice is not something which is automatically given in simple experience 
of a practice; it is a form of theoretical understanding through which we interpret and evaluate our experience’ 
27 For a thorough analysis of the application of Schön's model to legal education see Jones (1996).  Recent 
attempts to clarify the numerous re-definitions that Schön has undergone are summarised in Cole (1997) pp.11-
13 
28 The DTS Council recently undertook a comprehensive review of professional education of TSOs.  The 
contract research, funded by LGMB and ITSA (Institute for Trading Standards Administration, the professional 
body for Trading Standards) was a UK-wide review of the education and training of Trading Standards Officers 
which focused on the current structure and delivery of the current Diploma in Trading Standards, and the 
25 
                                                
possible models of future structure and delivery.  It was conducted by Glasgow Caledonian University and 
Stonely Consultants (Maharg et al 1997).  Copies of the report are available from the Improvement and 
Development Agency for Local Government, or from the Chief Executive of the Institute of Trading Standards.  
See Gresty (1997) for a summary of the findings.  Amongst our  key recommendations was that the curriculum 
structure of the new Diploma qualification should be built upon an integrative view of professional knowledge 
and skills; learning contracts, workbooks and problem-based learning should be implemented to facilitate 
transfer of learning between academic and work-based learning; evaluation instruments should follow teaching 
and learning forms and criteria, not vice versa; and that procedures should be designed which ensured that there 
was a genuine partnership in learning and teaching between all the relevant interested parties: students, 
universities, LGMB, DTS Council, ITSA and local authorities. 
29 In saying this I do not underestimate the part that economics and finance has to play in the provision of legal 
education, nor the part that financial provision has to play in the Funding Council's Quality Assessments.  See 
Twining (1994), pp.41-2.   
 
The theoretical literature on the quality debate is considerable, and a number of student and staff development 
units are specialising in this field.  See for example the Centre for Research on Learning and Instruction at the 
University of Edinburgh.  Amongst their many publications relevant to this point are Entwistle & Entwistle 
(1992), Entwistle & Entwistle (1991), Entwistle & Marton (1994). 
